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Abstract
Church and state have historically had an uneasy relationship, sometimes close
allies, at others harsh adversaries, and at still others largely independent of one
another. This paper develops an economic model of this relationship, where the
state’s objective is to maximize net tax revenue, while the church provides reli-
gious goods. Religious goods benefit the state in two ways: first, they provide
utility to citizens, thus allowing the state to extract more taxes before running
up against citizens’ reservation utility (the point at which they would revolt), and
second, they potentially provide legitimacy to the state, thereby lowering the costs
of tax collection. If the latter effect is strong enough, the state may find it opti-
mal to take control of the church, either to enhance its legitimizing effect, or to
suppress its de-legitimizing effect. To evaluate the model’s implications, we use
recent cross-country data on the relationship between religion and state, including
measures coded from the 2001, 2003, and 2005 International Religious Freedom
reports. We also examine in more detail some of the paradigmatic cases indicated
by the model, presenting various types of evidence from current and historical
examples of each case.
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 Throughout history, church and state have had an uneasy relationship.  At times 
they have been close allies, at others harsh adversaries, and at still others largely 
independent of one another.  The model in this paper attempts to explain these different 
configurations as special cases emerging from a single framework that is driven by the 
interaction between a self-interested sovereign (dictator) and citizens.  The goal of the 
sovereign is to maximize his private consumption, which is equal to the taxes he can 
extract from the citizen, minus the cost of collection and possibly the cost of supporting a 
state-run church.  The only limit on the sovereign’s power is the ability of citizens to exit 
or revolt (i.e., replace the sovereign).1 
 The role of the church in this setting, whether independent or state-run, is to 
provide “religious goods” to the citizenry. Religious goods will have two effects on the 
state’s power to tax.  First, they provide utility to citizens in the form of worship, 
dispensation of sins, assuagement of grief, promise of salvation, etc.  This benefits the 
state indirectly because it raises the level of citizen utility, thereby allowing the state to 
extract more resources from citizens before running up against their reservation utility 
(the point at which they would revolt).  This aspect of the model reflects Marx’s notion of 
religion as the “opiate of the masses.”  Second, religious goods can potentially provide 
                                                 
1 We focus initially on a self-interested dictator given the relatively modern invention of 
democratic government, and the relative lack of benevolent dictators throughout history.  
Below, however, we discuss the implications of allowing a government whose objective 
is maximization of citizen utility. 
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“legitimacy” to the state, for example by declaring the sovereign to be divine or divinely 
inspired. This has the direct effect of lowering the cost of collecting taxes.   
 In this simple setting, we consider two regimes: one in which the state controls 
the church and therefore chooses the level of spending on religious goods (including no 
spending, or suppression), and one in which the state allows the church to act 
independently. From the sovereign’s perspective the trade off is as follows.  The 
advantage of state control of the church is that the state can choose the level of religious 
spending to suit its own objective (i.e., maximization of net tax revenues), whereas an 
independent church serves the interests of citizens.  The disadvantage of state control is 
that spending on religious goods must be financed out of tax revenues, which are costly 
to collect (i.e., some resources are lost in the process of collecting taxes).  The optimal 
regime from the sovereign’s perspective depends on which of these factors is stronger.  
 The impact of religious goods on tax collection costs is crucial in this regard 
because the stronger that effect is, the more desirable it is for the state to control the 
church, either through an alliance (if church teaching is favorable toward the state), or 
through suppression (if church teaching is sufficiently unfavorable toward the state).  As 
Adam Smith observed, the state ignores the influence of the church at its peril: “The 
sovereign can … never be secure unless he has the means of influencing in a considerable 
degree the greater part of the teachers of [the established] religion” (Smith [1776] 1965, 
p. 749).  The key factor here is the nature of church “doctrine,” that is, the extent to 
which the teaching of the church legitimizes or de-legitimizes the state.  We treat church 
doctrine parametrically in the model. 
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 To evaluate the results of the model, we present two types of evidence.  The first 
is a quantitative analysis of the recently available cross-country data on the relationship 
between religion and state.  In addition to providing basic information on some of the 
traditional variables of interest, these data contain abundant detail on the state-church 
relationship and include variables that can serve as suitable proxies for the two types of 
special influences on state control identified by the model, namely the power of the 
church and the level of legitimacy it provides to the state (as reflected by church 
doctrine).  Controlling for various demographic, social, political, and other country 
characteristics, we examine the effects of church power and church doctrine on the state’s 
financial control of the church.  The results are consistent with the implications of the 
model. 
 Going beyond quantifiable evidence and econometric trends, we also examine in 
more detail some of the paradigmatic cases indicated by the model.  This allows us to 
study each case from a broader perspective by including all types of evidence and 
considering both current and historical examples of each.  Using the model as a guide, we 
examine the variety of ways in which church doctrine and church power have historically 
influenced the state’s decision of whether to control, suppress, or grant independence to 
the church.   
 
2. STATE AND THE PROVISION OF RELIGIOUS GOODS: OVERVIEW 
As noted, the political economy of the relationship between state and religion can 
be grouped into three general categories based on the state’s involvement in the provision 
of religious goods.  The state can grant religious organizations complete autonomy in 
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setting the quantity of goods to produce, it can control the quantity itself, or it can 
suppress their provision altogether by setting the quantity equal to zero.  There are, of 
course, numerous further possibilities within each category, and there are also various 
social, political, and other dimensions of the relationship between state and religion.2  To 
simplify the analysis, we focus on the political economy of this relationship and reduce 
the possibilities to the three categories mentioned.  As we discuss further in Section 6 
below, each of these cases has been variously observed throughout history. 
The case of independence between church and state is often considered as being 
an ideal towards which all societies should navigate.  Social scientists of religion have 
long anticipated the gradual separation of church from state as one of the predictions of 
the well-known secularization theory, an anticipation that seems to survive despite 
recently growing criticisms of some of the theory’s other predictions on religious 
behavior.3  Independence appears far from being the norm in the World today, however, 
as can be seen in the cross-national data coded from the U.S. State Department’s recent 
annual International Religious Freedom (IRF) Reports.4  Judging by how many states 
have funded the provision of religious goods and imposed restrictions on religious 
practices, a surprisingly small proportion of countries in the world have actually achieved 
                                                 
2 For empirically distinguishable forms of social and political influences on religion and 
international indexes of these influences, see Grim and Finke (2006). 
3 For the debate on secularization theory, see Stark (1999) and Norris and Inglehart 
(2004). 
4 The data files are available online at the website of the Association of Religious Data 
Archives (ARDA): thearda.com.  See also Grim and Finke (2006) for a description of the 
data, indexes constructed from it, and a list of included countries.  Other sources of cross-
national data on state control of religion include the World values Surveys, the World 
Christian Encyclopedia (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson, 2001), and measures of religious 
freedom offered by the Freedom House.  For uses and limitations of these data, see Barro 
and McCleary (2006a: 54-57), Fox and Sandler (2005), and Grim and Finke (2006: 4-6). 
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independence of church from state.  According to the annual IRF data for the years 2001, 
2003, and 2005, in only 12 of the 196 surveyed countries have the states refrained from 
funding or regulating religious practices.5   
More typical has been the case of some form of state control of the provision of 
religious goods.  According to the IRF reports, about 80% of countries in the World have 
shown some form of involvement, funding religious education or buildings, paying 
clergy salaries or benefits, or sponsoring religious media, charity, or practices.  
Involvement has varied by regions.  Table 1 shows the distribution of state funding of 
religion by geographic regions during this period.  State funding was least common in 
Africa and East Asia and Pacific, where about two-thirds of the countries provided 
funding, the highest in South Asia and Near East and North Africa, and also very high in 
Europe and Eurasia.  In the Western Hemisphere (excluding the U.S.), about three-
quarters of countries provided some form of funding for the provision of religious goods 
and services.6   
State control of the church has perhaps been the most common form of 
relationship between church and state.  In the ancient world, religious institutions were 
typically subordinated and controlled by the state (Johnston, 2004).  In some societies, 
the ruler was also the religious leader, as was the case in the Hindu religion or under the 
institution of khalifat in the early Islamic states.  There were also other societies where 
the state and church were distinct institutions, yet the rulers exercised tremendous power 
                                                 
5 More specifically, these are the countries for which the government funding index 
(variable labeled FUNDEXAG in the ARDA files) and the government regulation index 
(GRI_AG) are zero.  Although there were 38 countries in which the state did not fund 
religion, there were various forms of restrictions on religious practices in 26 of them. 
6 The IRFR were not prepared for the United States. 
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over the church, as was the case in the earlier Buddhist and Christian societies.  Echoes of 
this type of outcome can also be found in some modern states.  The King of Nepal, for 
example, was until recently revered as a Hindu god, and the British monarch is still 
officially the Supreme Governor of the Church of England.  The ruler’s control of 
religion has also been the norm among tribal societies. 
The case of state suppression of the church has been a more recent phenomenon 
(though state persecution of some religious sects, notably Christianity in the Roman 
Empire prior to Constantine, has occurred throughout history). Well-known 
manifestations of this phenomenon in the twentieth century have occurred under 
communist regimes, for example in the Soviet Union, where the state banned religious 
activities, confiscated Church property, and prohibited the provision of religious goods.  
Although this type of policy came to an end in most places with the fall of communism, 
suppression of religious activities can still be observed in some societies, for example in 
Tibet, Vietnam, Eritrea, and North Korea.  
 
3. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE AND RELIGION 
The literature on the economics of religion has recently been extended to the 
political economy of the relationship between state and religion.7  This is a trend 
consistent with the recent spread of political economy to new areas of research in 
economics, sociology, politics and other disciplines (Weingast and Wittman, 2006).  It 
has also been greatly facilitated by the recent availability of reliable cross-national data 
                                                 
7 For reviews of the general literature on the economics of religion, see Iannoccone 
(1998) and Barro and McCleary (2006a). 
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on religious behavior, freedom, and institutions.  The literature on state and religion can 
be divided into two groups depending on whether the studied influence flows from the 
state to religion or the other way around.   
The first group consists of those studies investigating how government policies 
have influenced religious behavior and institutions.  Reviving Smith’s ideas regarding the 
consequences of state regulation of religion, Iannaccone (1991), Finke and Stark (1992), 
and others have developed the religion-market model, which holds that greater 
competition in the religion market tends to stimulate higher levels of religious activity.  
Much of the initial evidence supporting this argument came from historical analyses of 
changing trends in regulation and religiosity in the United States and other specific cases, 
or from cross-national comparisons of measures of religious pluralism and religious 
participation in limited contexts.  More recently, however, Barro and McCleary (2006a, 
2006b) have used larger-scale cross-national data to test the implications of religion-
market model along with other hypotheses regarding the political economy of state 
regulation of religion. 
The second group of contributions to the literature on state and religion consists 
of those studying how the presence of religion has affected the behavior of the state itself.  
This is a fairly recent area of research in the political economy literature, investigating 
how and why the state has been involved in the provision of religious goods and services.  
Barro and McCleary (2005), for example, have studied the determinants of which 
countries have state religions, focusing on what determines the structure of the religion 
market and the likelihood of a government granted monopoly.  Gill (2005) has similarly 
studied the origins of state regulation of religion, proposing a theoretical approach that 
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focuses on the political self-interest of government officials.  The state’s financial 
involvement in the provision of religious goods, however, has not been systematically 
investigated.  As Grim and Finke (2006) have shown, state regulation of religion operates 
along a different dimension than state favoritism of one religion.  The state’s direct 
financial involvement may similarly be operating along yet another dimension.   
We contribute to the literature on state and religion by developing a model that 
explicitly asks what factors influence the state’s decision of whether or not to provide 
religious goods.  Going beyond previous research centered on the basic question of 
market structure, we study the financial basis and “internal organization” of the 
production of religious goods and the determinants of the choice between state and 
private provision of these goods.  We derive the basic argument from a political economy 
model of church and state behavior, building on simple microeconomic principles such as 
self-interest and maximization and introducing novel concepts such as legitimacy and 
church power.  We then offer empirical support for the model’s implications, first with 
econometric evidence based on the recently available cross-national data. The extensive 
coverage of some of the newly available data makes it possible to generate suitable 
proxies for “doctrine” and “church power,” thus allowing a quantitative test of the 
implications of the model.  To provide further support for the argument, we also discuss 
some of the historical and current examples of the prototypical cases in more detail. 
 
4. THE MODEL 
 The model is an adaptation of one first developed by Brennan and Buchanan 
(1980), and extended by Wintrobe (1998), in which a self-interested sovereign (the 
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Leviathan) maximizes the surplus of taxes over spending on a public good. To keep the 
model simple, we only consider spending on a “religious good,” either by the state (in the 
case of a state-run church), or the religious community (in the case of an independent 
church).  The basic conclusions of the model would not be affected if the state also 
provided a separate public good.8 
 In the model, the representative citizen has a utility function given by 
 U = x +  v(q),         (1) 
where x is composite consumption, and q is the quantity of a religious good, where v'>0, 
v˝<0.  The religious good consists of those services typically provided by the church, 
including worship, dispensation of sins, comforting the sick and grieving, etc.  The 
citizen is endowed with wealth of E, an amount T of which the government confiscates in 
taxes.  The citizen therefore has after-tax wealth of, E–T, which he or she can spend on x 
and, in the case of an independent church, on religious goods. 
 Tax collection is costly to the government because of resistance by citizens to 
having their property confiscated.  We capture this by assuming that a fraction δ of each 
tax dollar collected must be spent on enforcement.  This cost will tend to be lower, 
however, as the government is seen as being more legitimate.  As noted, religious 
spending can potentially provide this legitimacy, for example by proclaiming that the 
sovereign is divinely inspired (or is himself divine).  We thus write δ=δ(λq), where λ is a 
                                                 
8 We have worked out the details of the more general model to verify this claim.  In that 
version of the model, the state chooses the public good and finances it with taxes, 
regardless of the relationship between the church and state.  We provide some details of 
this model in footnotes where appropriate or informative. 
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parameter that reflects the extent to which religious goods convey legitimacy, δ'<0.9  One 
interpretation of λ is that it reflects church doctrine, which we take as given.10  
 We do not restrict λ a priori in magnitude or sign; λ>0 means that religion 
legitimizes the state, λ=0 means that religion is neutral regarding the state, and λ<0 means 
that religion de-legitimizes the state (e.g., incites resistance). Thus, we assume that for 
q>0, δ→0 as λ→∞ and δ→1 as λ→−∞.  We also assume that δ(0)≡δ0, where 0<δ0<1.  
The objective for the state is to maximize tax revenues net of enforcement costs and, in 
the case of a state-run church, the cost of the religious good.   
 
4.1. State-Run Church 
 Consider first the case of a state-run church.  Net tax revenues in this case are 
given by 
T[1–δ(λq)] – c(q),         (2) 
where c(q) is the cost of providing the religious good.  The state’s problem is to choose q 
to maximize (2) subject to the constraint that U≥U , where U represents the citizen’s best 
alternative utility (the exit option).  Since the state finances religious spending in this 
case, the citizen’s budget constraint is simply x=E−T.  Substituting this into (1) and 
setting U=U  (given that the constraint will be binding) yields the tax function: 
 T = E + v(q) − U .        (3)  
Substituting this expression into (2) yields the state’s (unconstrained) objective function: 
                                                 
9 Our notion of legitimacy is similar to Wintrobe’s concept of “loyalty,” which 
contributes to the dictator’s “power” (Wintrobe, 1998, p. 46).  
10 A more general model would treat doctrine as a choice variable of the church, for 
example, as “revealed” to its founder or a prophet, or as dictated by a religious leader or 
governing body.  We discuss the difficulties in developing such an extension in the 
conclusion.    
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 [E + v(q) − U ](1–δ(λq)) – c(q).      (4) 
The resulting first order condition for q is  
 v′(1−δ) − Tλδ′ = c′.        (5) 
Let )(ˆ λq denote the resulting level of religious goods.   
Note that the left-hand side of (5), which is the marginal benefit of q, captures the 
two effects of religious goods on tax revenues as described above.  The first term is the 
direct marginal benefit of religious goods (net of enforcement costs) to the citizen.  This 
benefits the state because the higher is the citizen’s utility, the more able/willing he or she 
is to pay taxes.  The second term is the marginal benefit of religious goods in the form of 
reduced enforcement costs (assuming λ >0).  At the optimum, the sum of these benefits 
equals the marginal cost of q.  Differentiation of (5) shows that ∂ qˆ /∂λ>0.  That is, the 
state provides more religious goods as the beneficial effect of those goods on collection 
costs increases.  Finally, substituting qˆ into (4) yields the maximized value of the state’s 
objective function under a state-run church: 
V1( qˆ ) = [E + v( qˆ ) − U ](1–δ(λ qˆ )) –c( qˆ ).     (6) 
Differentiating (6) with respect to λ (and invoking the Envelope Theorem) implies  
∂V1/∂λ = −δ′ qˆ  [E + v( qˆ ) − U ] > 0.      (7)   
Thus, as religious goods confer greater legitimacy on the state, its net tax revenues 
increase. 
 
4.2. Independent Church 
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  Now consider the case of an independent church.  The key difference here is that 
citizens rather than the government choose the level of religious spending. We initially 
assume that the church acts to maximize the well-being of citizens rather than pursuing a 
more selfish motive.  This either reflects the case of perfect competition among 
independent churches in the “market for religion,” or a single benevolent church.  Later, 
we relax this assumption. 
  Given the preceding assumption, we can view the citizen as choosing both x and q 
to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint E−T=x+c(q).  The resulting first-order 
condition for q is  
v′ = c′.          (8) 
Denote the resulting level of religious goods by q*.  Note that this condition differs from 
(5) in two ways.  First, there is no enforcement cost since religious spending is voluntary 
rather than tax-financed.11  This will tend to make q* larger than qˆ . Second, citizens 
ignore the effect of q on tax collection costs.  This will tend to make q* smaller than qˆ .  
(It also means that q* is independent of λ.) Generally, therefore, it is not possible to say 
which regime results in greater provision of the religious good.   
 As above, the state collects taxes up to the point where the citizen’s exit constraint 
is binding; that is, U=U .  The result is 
 T = E + v(q*) −  c(q*) − U .       (9) 
                                                 
11 The independent church may, however, face a different cost of financing its output—
namely, free riding by members.  We ignore this problem here, but acknowledge that it 
could provide a different rationale for the state to take control of the church.   
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Substituting this into the expression for net taxes, T[1–δ(λq)], yields the state’s net return 
under an independent church:12  
 V2(q*) = [E + v(q*) − c(q*) − U ](1–δ(λq*)).      (10) 
Differentiating (10) implies that 
 ∂V2/∂λ = −δ′q* [E + v(q*) − c(q*) − U ] > 0.    (11) 
Thus, although the church is independent of the state, net taxes still rise as religion 
confers greater legitimacy on the state.    
 
4.3. Comparison of the Two Regimes 
 In our model, we view the state as the dominant player in the sense that it has 
ultimate control over the church. In particular, we assume that it can seize control of the 
church, or suppress it, depending on how the church affects the state’s net return.13  
While we recognize that this assumption does not capture situations in which church and 
state are co-equal (or where the church is dominant), we nevertheless feel that our 
approach reflects the generally dominant position of the state throughout history.  (For 
example, we know of no cases of the church suppressing the state.)  Given this 
specification, the choice between a state-run and an independent church depends only on 
                                                 
12 Note that the state has no explicit choice variable in this case, given our assumption 
that it does not provide a public good. In the more general model, the state chooses the 
level of the public good to maximize net taxes, taking q* as given.  Generally, one can 
show that the state’s optimal level of the public good will be increasing in q when λ>0, 
and decreasing in q when λ<0.  This reflects the effect of q on tax collection costs.  
13 In our model, we do not distinguish between a truly state-run church and an 
“independent” church that is regulated by the state.  For example, we do not distinguish 
between a state that chooses q and one that subsidizes the church so that it chooses the 
state’s desired level of q.  
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a comparison of (6) and (10).  We consider three cases, depending on the magnitude and 
sign of λ. 
Case (i): λ=0, Religion is Neutral Toward the State  
 We first consider the case where λ=0; that is, religious goods are neutral regarding 
the state’s legitimacy.  In this case, (5) reduces to  
 (1–δ0)v'  = c′,         (12) 
where, recall, 0< δ0<1 is constant.  Comparing this condition to (5) implies that q*> qˆ >0.  
Thus, while the independent church provides more religious goods, the state-run church 
still provides a positive amount.  This is true, as noted, because the better off citizens are, 
the more willing they are to pay taxes before the exit option becomes binding (reflecting 
the pacifying function of religion).  
 Net tax revenue for the state under the state-run church in this case is   
 V1( qˆ ) = [E + v( qˆ ) − U ](1–δ0) –c( qˆ ), 
or, after re-arranging, 
      = [E + v( qˆ )– )ˆ(qc − U ](1–δ0) – δ0 )ˆ(qc .     (13) 
Compare this to net revenue under the independent church: 
 V2(q*) = [E + v(q*) − c(q*) − U ](1–δ0).      (14) 
Notice that, since q* by definition maximizes v(q)–c(q), the term in square brackets must 
be larger in (14) than in (13).  It follows immediately that V2( qˆ ) > V1(q*), which leads to 
the following result: 
 
Proposition 1:  When religious spending is neutral towards the state (i.e., when λ=0), an 
independent church is preferred to a state-run church.   
 15
 
Intuitively, only the direct effect of church spending on citizen utility operates in this 
case, and since an independent, benevolent church achieves this effect without the need 
for distortionary taxation, it dominates the state-run church.  This result is depicted in 
Figure 1 (a). 
Case (ii): λ>0, Religion Legitimizes the State 
 Now let λ be positive so that religion confers some legitimacy on the state in the 
form of lower tax collection costs.  As we showed above, )(ˆ λq increases with λ while q* 
remains fixed.  Thus, for large enough λ, )(ˆ λq >q*.  That is, when the legitimizing 
benefits of religion are strong enough, the state-run church actually supplies more 
religious goods than does the independent church.  How does this affect the choice 
between the independent and state-run churches? 
 Note first that V2(q)>V1(q) for any strictly positive q, reflecting the distortionary 
effect of tax financing for the state-run church.  This inherent advantage of the 
independent church, however, may be offset by the fact that the state-run church controls 
q.  Specifically, recall that qˆ  maximizes V1(q) for any λ, whereas q* is chosen by the 
independent church to maximize the citizen’s utility (according to (8)).  As a 
consequence, when λ>0, q* must be less than the level of spending that would maximize 
V2(q), given that the independent church does not internalize the beneficial effect of 
religious spending on the sovereign’s tax collection costs.  This effect was not present 
when λ=0, so the independent church dominated, as shown in Figure 1 (a).  However, 
when λ>0, the ability of the state-run church to internalize the impact of q on collection 
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costs gives it an advantage that, if strong enough, may overcome the tax distortion.  Two 
possible cases are shown in Figures 1 (b) and (c). 
 In Figure 1 (b), qˆ >q *, but V2(q*)> )ˆ(1 qV .  Thus, even though the optimal level of 
religious spending by the state-run church exceeds that under the independent church, the 
latter still dominates.  (Obviously, the independent church would also dominate for any λ 
such that q*> qˆ .)  However, as λ increases, there may come a point where )ˆ(1 qV >V2(q*), 
as illustrated in Figure 1 (c).  In this case, the state-run church is preferred.   
 Case (iii): λ<0, Religion De-legitimizes the State    
 The final case is where religious teaching or doctrine acts to de-legitimize the 
state.  This is captured in the model by λ <0, which implies that increased religious 
spending actually raises tax collection costs.  As in the previous cases, this will have no 
effect on the independent church inasmuch as q* is independent of λ.  It will, however, 
lower qˆ since increases in q will now raise δ. (Specifically, the − Tλδ′  term in equation 
(5) is now negative).  It is important to emphasize, however, that qˆ will not necessarily 
fall to zero in this case because the beneficial effect of religion on the citizen’s utility 
remains present.  In other words, the state will tolerate a positive level of religious 
spending (and indeed, will invest in some itself), even if that spending is anti-state, 
because it still serves the beneficial function of pacifying citizens.  
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If λ becomes sufficiently negative, however, the state-run church will cease to 
provide religious goods—in effect, the state will suppress the church.14  The return to the 
sovereign in this case is 
  V1(0) = [E + v(0) − U ](1−δ0).     (15) 
If we assume, first, that suppression of religion is costless, and second, that such an 
action does not drive the citizen below his reservation utility, then this represents an 
extreme but viable version of the state-run church—namely, no church, or a purely 
secular state.15  The sovereign will find this extreme outcome attractive over that range of 
λ where V1(0)>V2(q*), which will eventually hold as δ(λq*) approaches one.   
 As a summary of the preceding results, Figure 2 shows the ranges of λ over which 
the various cases apply.  The critical values of λ are λ1>0 and λ2<0.  First, in the range 
where λ>λ1, the state-run church dominates.  Here, church and state are allied in the 
sense that the sovereign chooses the level of religious spending and finances this 
spending with taxes.  In this region, religion legitimizes the state and helps the sovereign 
achieve his goal of extracting as much tax revenue as possible from the citizens.   
Next, over the range λ2<λ<λ1, the independent church dominates.  Here, church 
and state operate independently, though religion still affects the state’s ability to collect 
taxes.  Note in particular that this range includes situations in which the church 
legitimizes the state (λ>0), is neutral toward the state (λ=0), and de-legitimizes the state 
                                                 
14 In the model where the state provides a separate public good, the state will provide 
more of the public good when it suppresses the church (i.e., sets q=0) than when it allows 
the church to remain independent, all else equal.    
15If (15) is negative, then q=0 is not consistent with a positive return for the sovereign.  
In that case, the state will allow the amount of religious spending necessary to prevent 
popular revolt.   
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(λ<0).  In all cases, however, the state allows the church to remain independent because 
doing so provides indirect benefits to the state by pacifying citizens (which makes them 
more compliant taxpayers), and also saves the state the cost of supporting the church out 
of tax revenues (which is distortionary).   
Finally, over the range where λ<λ2, the state suppresses the church (that is, takes 
over the church and sets q=0).  Here, the de-legitimizing effects of church teachings are 
so detrimental to the state that it finds it optimal to eliminate religion altogether (or at 
least to greatly curtail religious spending). 
 
4.4. Non-Benevolent Church 
 It cannot be disputed that throughout history, there have been cases where the 
church has acted out of motives other than beneficence toward its followers.  Here we 
examine the implications of allowing the independent church to act in a self-interested 
manner; specifically, to maximize profit.   
 Formally, the church chooses q to maximize R–c(q), subject to the citizen’s utility 
constraint: 
  E – T – R + v(q) = U ,      (16)  
where R represents total contributions to the church, or the tithe.  Assuming that the 
church takes the tax liability of the citizen, T, as given (owing to the state’s superior 
claim), it will first solve (16) for R and then choose q to maximize 
  E − T + v(q) − U − c(q),      (17) 
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which yields the same first-order condition as (8).  Thus, the church provides the same 
level religious goods, q*, as the competitive church.  This is true here because, by 
maximizing the citizen’s utility, it can extract the maximum donation.  
Now let π be the profits earned by the non-benevolent church, where π≥0.  That 
is, R−c(q*)=π, or R=c(q*)+π.  Substituting this expression into (16) and solving for T 
yields the citizen’s tax payment 
  T = E + v(q*) − c(q*) − π − U ,     (18) 
and the corresponding return to the state 
 V2(q*,π) = [E + v(q*) − c(q*)− π − U ](1–δ(λq*)).   (19)  
Note that (10) is a special case of this expression where π=0.  Higher values of π reflect a 
stronger church in the sense that it can extract a larger share of the citizen’s total ability to 
pay.  (Thus, π is bounded above by E−v(q*)−c(q*)−U , the point at which T=0.)   
 Now consider the comparison between the independent and state-run churches.  
Note that a larger π makes the independent church less desirable from the state’s 
perspective.16  In terms of Figure 2, increases in π cause the V2 curve to shift down, thus 
reducing the range over which the independent church dominates (i.e., λ1 decreases while 
λ2 increases). At some point, the independent church may no longer be viable.  Figure 3 
summarizes the various regions where each of the three regimes dominates, depending on 
the nature of church doctrine (λ) and the degree of church power (π).  As the diagram 
reveals, an independent church occupies a region where religious doctrine is neither too 
favorable nor too detrimental to the state, and where the church’s power is limited. 
                                                 
16 As Smith ([1776] 1965, p. 765) notes, “It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that, 
all other things being supposed equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily 
be, either the sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other.”  
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4.5. Democratic State 
 To this point, we have concentrated on dictatorial states in which the sovereign 
acts purely out of self-interest.  In this section we ask how the analysis changes when the 
state is democratic (or at least, benevolent).  Specifically, suppose that the state acts to 
maximize the utility of citizens subject to its budget constraint. 
 In the case of a state-run church, the state will choose q to maximize U=E–T+v(q) 
subject to T[1–δ(λq)]=c(q).  The first order conditions turns out to be identical to (5), 
yielding )(ˆ λq in religious goods, the same amount as provided by the self-interested state.  
The maximized value of the state’s objective function in this case, however, is the 
citizen’s maximized utility (rather than net taxes), given by 




λδ−  .     (20) 
 Now consider the independent church, which we initially assume is also 
benevolent.  As above, it chooses q* in religious goods (the solution to (8)), and the 
citizen’s maximized utility is  
  V2d = E + v(q*) – c(q*).      (21) 
Clearly, this will exceed (20) for all values of λ, given that the independent church does 
not incur the distortion associated with tax financing. Thus, we have: 
 
Proposition 2:   If the church and state are both benevolent, then an independent church 
dominates the state-run church for all λ.17 
                                                 
17 In fact, the state raises no taxes at all in this case, given our simple model in which the 
only publicly-provided good is religion.  When the state provides a separate public good, 
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 Finally, suppose that the church is a profit-maximizer.  In that case, the citizen’s 
realized utility (and the benevolent state’s objective function) becomes 
  V2d = E + v(q*) – c(q*) – π,      (22) 
where π is again the church’s profit.  If this profit is large enough, the state may prefer to 
take over the church and operate it as a state-run church (or to suppress it).  In this case, 
however, the benevolent state is actually acting in the citizen’s interest to prevent 
exploitation by an overly powerful church. 
  
5. A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 
5.1. Data and Methodology 
 To evaluate the model’s implications, we use recent cross-national data on the 
relationship between state and religion.  Until recently, research on the political economy 
of religion had been hampered by the availability of reliable data gathered consistently 
across nations.  Various new sources of data have now become available, however, based 
on cross-national opinion polls or constructed reliably from systematic reports.  One of 
the first contributions was the World Christian Database (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson, 
2001), which presents detailed current and historical information on all world religions 
and church-state relationships in a large number of countries.  Barro and McCleary 
                                                                                                                                                 
one might expect that a state-run church could dominate for large enough λ due to the 
favorable effect λ has on tax collection costs.  However, this turns out not to be true (i.e., 
Proposition 2 continues to hold).  The reason is that taxes must be raised to finance the 
public good under both regimes (state-run and independent churches).  Thus, the 
independent church still dominates because in that case, taxes do not have to be raised to 
finance the church.  
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(2005, 2006a, 2006b) have used this data for their analysis.  Other recent sources of data 
include the country reports and the measure of “Freedom of Expression and Belief” 
prepared by the Freedom House, the Religion and State dataset assembled by Fox and 
Sandler (2004), and the values surveys conducted by the European Values Study 
Foundation and World Values Survey Association.   
A more comprehensive source of data in terms of both the number of countries 
surveyed and the extent of information available for each country is contained in the 
annual International Religious Freedom (IRF) Reports prepared by the U.S. State 
Department since the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act in 1998.  
Researchers from the American Religious Data Archive (ARDA) have recently assigned 
quantitative measures to the information contained in these reports, systematically coding 
the information for 196 nations and making the data available to other researchers on 
their website.  Using these data, Grim and Finke (2006) have developed various indexes 
that measure different forms of social and governmental control of religion.   
The IRF data are particularly relevant to our analysis because they include 
detailed information on state funding of religion and other variables that can be used as 
reasonable proxies for the power of religious organizations and for the way religion can 
convey legitimacy to the state.  Because of its more extensive coverage, we use the 
aggregate file of the IRF data based on the ARDA’s coding of the 2001, 2003, and 2005 
reports.  Relying primarily on the IRF data for variables directly related to the church-
state relationship, we also include variables from other sources to control for the various 
social, political, demographic, and economic factors that might have also influenced this 
relationship. 
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The dependent variable in our regressions is a proxy for state financing of 
religious spending, namely an index of religious activities funded by the state.  The 
ARDA file includes numerous variables and indexes on different forms of government 
regulation or support of religious activities, including those that can serve as suitable 
proxies for state involvement in the provision of religious goods formulated in the model.  
Since the model’s argument is based on financial involvement, the most suitable proxy 
would be state funding of religion.  Although the state’s choice is simplified in the model 
(representing an all-or-nothing decision of whether to fund religious spending), in reality 
this can be implemented in various ways and degrees.  To account for this variation, the 
index depends on whether the government funds the following items related to religion: 
religious education/schools, buildings/upkeep/repair, clergy salaries/benefits, 
print/broadcast media, charity/public service work, and religious practice or mission 
work.  The index of funding gives equal weight to each of these items and has been 
rescaled to range between zero and one.  
An explanatory variable of primary interest is church doctrine, the way religion 
can convey legitimacy to the state.  Although the IRF reports do not include this 
information exactly, there are a number of variables that can be used to construct a proxy 
index of doctrine.  We have identified five variables that are particularly relevant to the 
legitimacy relationship between church and state: whether the state has a Concordat with 
the Vatican, a relationship to the Vatican or other such international religious authorities 
(Anglican, Orthodox, Dalai Lama, etc.), agreements or special arrangements with 
domestic religious brands or institutions, whether there are any holy sites (e.g., shrines or 
places of pilgrimage), and whether there is a favored or established religious brand.  
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Giving equal weight to these variables, we have rescaled the index of doctrine to range 
between zero and one. 
 The other factor of primary interest is the power of the church, its ability to 
extract a share of the general population’s ability to pay.  The IRF data include two 
variables on tax-exemptions applying to religious organizations that seem particularly 
relevant here, namely whether religious organizations are taxed and whether the 
donations to them are tax-deductible.  We also use an index that has been commonly used 
to proxy market power in similar contexts, namely the Herfindahl index of religion 
adherence shares (including non-religion, in the year 2000), which is available in Barro’s 
Religion Adherence Data.18   
 To isolate the effects of variables representing legitimacy and power, we include 
several other variables that control for other characteristics of countries that could also 
influence the state provision of religious goods.  A determinant of state funding that was 
discussed in the model is the difference between dictatorship and democracy.  To control 
for differences in political structure, we use the “2000 Political Typology” index based on 
the Freedom House's “Democracy's Century” report.  We have reversed and rescaled the 
index available on the ARDA website to range between zero and one, such that higher 
numbers represent greater levels of democracy (on a coding consisting of the following 
                                                 
18 We assume the index did not change significantly between 2000 and 2001-05, the 
period covered by the IRF data.  Departing from the common practice, Barro and 
McCleary (2005: 1346-7) have used a different set of proxies for power, namely the 
fractions of population adhering to the main and second religions.   We checked the 
robustness of our results to the choice of an index for power by running the same 
regressions using their variables and found the results to be consistent between the two 
formulations.  Barro’s Religion Adherence Data is available on the Web: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.  
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types of regimes: protectorate, totalitarian, authoritarian, monarchy, restricted democratic 
practice, and democracy). 
 Various other differences in country characteristics and standards of living could 
also be determinants of state provision of religious goods.  To control for some of the 
well-known and consistently measured differences in geographic, demographic, and 
socio-economic factors, we include population, land area, income (per capita GDP), life 
expectancy at birth, and the proportion of Internet users.  Income and population 
generally fit the model better (with consistent results) in non-linear form, so we include 
these variables in logs.  Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of all variables 
included in the regression analyses.   
 We examined the relationship between these variables under various 
specifications.  In a baseline specification, we first regress all explanatory variables on 
state funding of religion in a standard OLS model.  To check the robustness of these 
results to model specification, we consider two other possibilities regarding the 
qualitative nature of the dependent variable and the possibility of its endogeneity with 
some of the explanatory variables.  First, since the index of state funding is a qualitative 
dependent variable that takes on limited values, we consider the possibility that a limited 
dependent variable model may be more appropriate.  To see how the results change under 
this specification, we estimate the same equation in an ordered probit model.  Second, we 
allow for an endogenous relationship between the dependent variable and some of the 
variables of primary interest.  Although these relationships are formulated in the model in 
a simple partial equilibrium framework, in reality they could be jointly determined.  One 
possibility is a two-way causation between state funding and church power.  To allow for 
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this possibility, we use instrumental variables that predict church power (Herfindahl 
index of religion adherence shares) and could be considered as being exogenous to state 
funding of religion.  In a similar context, Barro and McCleary (2005) have used a long 
lag of the endogenous variable as an instrument, a reasonable procedure we adopt (based 
on the importance of historical inertia for church power) by using the index of religion 
shares for the year 1900.  We also included in the list of instruments a “Government 
Regulation of Religion” index (coded by the ARDA) and two variables that capture other 
historical determinants of church power, namely the “1900 Political Typology” index 
(Freedom House) and a dummy variable on whether the country has a communist past 
(equals one if communist in 1970).  We use the method of three stage least squares to 
estimate the parameters of these equations. 
Yet another possibility is an additional two-way causation between state funding 
of religion and state doctrine, but it is difficult to find good instruments for the index of 
doctrine, itself a proxy variable.  We considered this possibility in a separate model with 
three simultaneous equations, using as instruments for doctrine the percent of GDP used 
on military expenditures, an index of government regulation of religion, and an index of 
country’s recent democratic past (“1950 Political Typology” index by Freedom House).  
Although not reported here to avoid redundancy, the results are consistent with the three 
stage model reported in Table 3 that involves a two-way causation between state funding 
and church power only.  Although the coefficients of variables in the basic equation 
become less significant, the signs are identical to those of the three stage model reported 




Table 3 shows the outcome of the three alternative methods of estimating the 
relationship between the variables.  The results are remarkably consistent.  Although the 
coefficients and standard errors change across the three methods as one would expect, the 
signs of all coefficients are identical.  Their significance is also remarkably consistent.  
The p-values corresponding to each coefficient generally fall within a close range across 
the three methods, raising our confidence that they capture the strength (or weakness) of 
the empirical evidence regarding the predictions of the model. 
The signs and the significance of the control variables are interesting.  Population 
and income have a positive and significant relationship with state funding, possibly 
because of scale economies in the provision of religious goods by the state and its greater 
abilities due to higher incomes.  The land area of a country, life expectancy of its citizens 
at birth, and the proportion of Internet users seem to have no significant effect on state 
funding of religion. 
The results provide strong empirical support for our arguments on the relationship 
between church doctrine, church power, and state provision of religious goods.  The 
coefficient of the index of church doctrine is positive and significant, indicating that the 
church’s ability to provide legitimacy to the state has a positive effect on the state 
provision of religious goods.  The coefficients of tax exemptions to donors and the 
church are also positive but not very significant.  This may reflect a more complicated 
relationship between these exemptions and state provision of religious goods (due, for 
example, to different tax elasticities of donations under state provision), suggesting that 
these variables may not be reflecting the power of the church directly.  In any case, the 
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coefficient of the Herfindahl index of power is positive and significant, which provides 
sufficiently strong support for our argument about a positive relationship between church 
power and state provision of religious goods.  The coefficient of the index of democracy 
is negative and significant, confirming the argument that more democratic (benevolent) 
states are less likely to get involved in the provision of religious goods and are thus more 
likely to allow independence to the church.   
One difficulty in interpreting these results as confirmation of the model as a 
whole is that they tell us little about the difference between the instances of independence 
and state suppression of the church.  In both independence and state suppression, state 
spending is zero, making it difficult to distinguish between them by looking at state 
spending only.19  To further differentiate between these cases, we thus need to look at 
other evidence on the private provision of religious goods.  Going beyond current 
quantitative evidence on church-state relationship is useful in a more general sense 
because it allows us to examine the overall argument more comprehensively.  There are 
numerous interesting configurations of the relationship between church doctrine, church 
power, and state provision of religious goods observed in history.  For a fuller analysis of 
the three paradigmatic cases covered by the model, we therefore offer a more informal 
survey of some current and historical examples. 
   
                                                 
19  Fortunately, this was not a major problem for quantitative analyses because there were 
only seven countries in which state funding was zero and state regulation was high.  
Dropping these observations from the sample or using interaction dummies to capture the 
differential effect on the dependent variable did not change the results significantly. 
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6. CHURCH AND STATE: CASE STUDIES 
 The strict separation implied by the case of complete independence means that the 
state does not in any way get involved in the provision of religious goods.  Although no 
country has been able to maintain this type of complete independence between church 
and state throughout its history, a benchmark case has been achieved in the United States.  
The legal basis for independence can be found in the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and in the powerful metaphor of a “wall of separation” made popular by 
Thomas Jefferson.  It is also enforced by an intricate network of checks and balances.  
Although the legal scholars have long debated the different dimensions, deeper realities, 
and further implications of the notion of separation, its economic significance can be 
reduced to the simple question of whether the government is directly involved in the 
provision of religious goods.20   
The political economy model developed here provides a new interpretation of the 
origins and strength of the separation between church and state in the U.S.  The state’s 
decision to grant independence to the church has been the product of a combination of 
factors regarding church doctrine, church power, and democracy.  Church doctrine is a 
factor because religion does not legitimize the state (λ=0).  There have been no political 
ties to the Vatican or other religious organizations, no inherited history of divinely 
ordained rulers, or any other mechanism for religion to convey legitimacy. Indeed, as we 
have noted, the government was founded on a rejection of the church as a political 
institution.  To be sure, religion plays a role in the American political sphere, but it 
                                                 
20 For the debate on the meaning and historical origins of “the wall of separation,” see 
Hamburger (2002). 
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carries no more or less weight than any other organized interest group in influencing 
policy decisions. 
The power of church (π) has also been low in the U.S. because of individual 
freedom and religious diversity.  There is a great variety of religious brands and emphasis 
on the local church, thus preventing any single brand from dominating the scene.  This 
was true even in the early days of the Republic when de Tocqueville ([1835] 2000, p. 
278) observed that “There is an innumerable multitude of sects in the United States.”  As 
a result, there is no history or tradition of religious organizations collecting taxes instead 
of or on behalf of the state, and these organizations typically do not generate high 
revenues from contributions or own a high proportion of the nation’s assets through 
donations.  In combination with the presence of a democratic state acting to maximize the 
utility of citizens, these factors ensure that the quantity of religious goods is decided 
privately by citizens without state involvement.  This represents the prototypical case for 
an independent church according to the model. 
A similar argument can be made about countries sharing some of these same 
characteristics.  For example, although Australia and New Zealand have much smaller 
populations than the U.S. and differ in many other respects, they share such things as 
democratic government, colonial history, liberal immigration policies, and ethnic and 
religious diversity.  They also share a high degree of democracy and low degrees of 
religious legitimacy and church power. The result is an independent church.21 
                                                 
21 The case of an independent church is not limited to modern times, however.  Stark 
(2007, Chapter 3) argues that the Roman Republic lacked a state-sponsored religion, 
having instead a relatively free “religious market” wherein multiple gods were 
worshipped in privately funded temples.  In this case, polytheism represents the 
counterpart to “sects” in the modern, predominantly monotheistic world. 
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At the opposite end of the spectrum, there have been several instances of state 
suppression of the church in recent history.  The best known example may be the Soviet 
Union, where a combination of high church power, a conflicting and de-legitimizing 
relationship with the state (λ<0), and low degrees of democracy, caused the state to 
suppress the church.  Prior to the 1917 Revolution, the Orthodox Church had traditionally 
been a powerful element in the Russian Empire (Kivelson and Greene, 2003).  The 
Orthodox population dominated the religious makeup, consisting of 76% of total 
population in 1900 (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson, 2001).  During centuries of its 
monopoly power, the Church had accumulated enormous wealth and power.22  The 
Orthodox Church, which was established as the state church and actively promoted 
Tsarist autocracy, also had a significant role in legitimizing the state.  When the 
Bolsheviks took power in 1917, however, Church doctrine came into sharp conflict with 
the new regime, making it incompatible with the communist ideology (and thus 
potentially de-legitimizing).  Since the high power of the Church also became an 
undesirable factor, the new state took drastic measures to suppress the Russian Orthodox 
Church systematically.  The state nationalized all Church property (including buildings), 
closed seminaries, persecuted or executed religious leaders, and prohibited the 
publication of religious materials (Powell, 1978; Shmelyov, 2005; Walters, 1986).  
Although the intensity of suppression changed throughout the Soviet regime, the history 
of the Orthodox Church during this period became an illustration of how sufficiently high 
                                                 
22 For example, as Burleigh (2007: 40) states, just prior to the revolution, “ the Orthodox 
Church claimed a hundred million adherents, two hundred thousand priests and monks, 
seventy-five thousand churches and chapels, over eleven hundred monasteries,” and so 
on.   
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church power and church doctrine that is sufficiently negative toward the ideology of the 
state would lead to suppression of church.  
A similar outcome has occurred in other communist regimes.  In China, for 
example, beginning in the 1950s and intensifying during the Cultural Revolution between 
1966 to 1976, the state sought to suppress religion.  Confucianism had been dominant in 
China for thousands of years, building strong institutions, shaping Chinese civilization, 
and gathering significant power.  However, as Chinese communists consolidated power 
in the 1950s, organized religion became a de-legitimizing factor against their rule, and 
the state gradually implemented a policy of suppressing religious activities.23  (Indeed, 
the communist regime went so far as to declare that Confucianism was not a religion 
(Stark, 2007, p. 269).)  A similar process has taken place in Vietnam, Eastern Europe, 
and other communist states.24   
Communist ideology has not been the only source of a conflicting and de-
legitimizing relationship between church and state.  State suppression of church has also 
recently been observed in Rwanda, Africa’s most Catholic society.  After the civil war 
and the 1994 genocide that resulted in a power shift, accusations arose that the Catholic 
Church was involved in the genocide and had sided with the former government.  
Viewing the Church with suspicion, the new government charged its leaders with crimes 
and suppressed its activities.25  
                                                 
23 For the history of church-state relations in China, see Goldman (1986) and Yang and 
Tamney (2005). 
24 Haynes (1998: Chapter 5), Ramet (1991), and Ramet and Treadgold (1995). 
25 For history and different perspectives on the Rwanda crisis, see Prunier (1998) and 
Berry and Berry (1999).  For a general history of conflicts between religion and politics 
in the twentieth century, see Burleigh (2007). 
 33
The final regime, state control of the church, has been perhaps the most 
commonly observed relationship between church and state throughout history.  Although 
such an alliance may have emerged as early as in primitive hunter-gatherer societies, we 
know too little about the practice and organization of primitive religions or about early 
rulers and religious organizations to assert with any confidence that their relationship can 
be understood in the context of our theory.  It is well-established, however, that in the 
ancient world, most civilizations had state-sponsored churches (Stark, 2007, p. 97), and 
the available evidence supports our argument regarding the direct relationship between 
state control of religion and high degrees of church power and legitimation.   
The extreme case of a high degree of legitimacy conferred by religion existed 
when the ruler was decreed to be divinely ordained, a situation that was characteristic of 
most societies in the Ancient World (Stark, 2007, pp. 101-102).  In ancient Egypt, for 
example, the pharaohs were divine figures, thus grounding the legitimacy of the kingdom 
in religious authority.  The power of the religious organization was also high, owing to 
the vast treasures coming from the collection of revenues for the temples.  Although the 
nature and status of sacred kingship changed during the long history of ancient Egypt, the 
degree of church power and the legitimacy generally remained high, and the state sought 
to control the priesthood by taking charge of the provision of religious goods.26  
State control of the church remained the norm among the more advanced 
agricultural societies of the medieval period, despite significant changes in the nature of 
church doctrine and power.  The doctrinal change was the rising importance of 
monotheistic religions, which supported beliefs in an abstract god.  As a result, the nature 
                                                 
26 Johnston (2004: 547-77), O’Connor and Silverman (1995). 
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of the legitimacy of rulers in Judaic, Christian, and Muslim societies generally changed 
(with some exceptions) from one in which the ruler was divinely ordained to one based 
on worldly protection of believers or the promotion of religion.  There also emerged 
greater division of labor between the rulers and direct providers of religious goods.   
Religion nevertheless continued to provide a high degree of legitimacy to the state 
by sanctifying political succession and providing the basis for taxation in the canonical 
law.  Tithing, for example, became institutionalized as a tax representing the “God’s 
share,” originating from the Old Testament and widely used from at least the time of 
Abraham and up to modern times.  Muslim societies similarly adopted a tax called ushr 
(one-tenth) with the same basis, along with a poll-tax on religious minorities.27  It was 
thus in the interest of the state to spend on religious goods in these societies because it 
conferred legitimacy in the form of lower tax collection costs.  
The high degree of church power during this period also contributed to state’s 
decision to be involved in the provision of religious goods.  The church had monopoly 
power in the interpretation of scriptures and the provision of religious services, 
eventually gaining command over a vast amount of resources through fees, donations, 
and bequests (Ekelund, et al, 1996).  Indeed, by the ninth century, the Catholic Church 
had become the largest landowner in Western Europe, owning about one-third (and as 
high as 44 percent in northern France) of all cultivated land (Herlihy, 1961: 86), and this 
situation persisted throughout the Middle Ages.28    
                                                 
27 For the relationship between the state, religious community, and taxation in Islamic 
history, see Coşgel, Ahmed, and Miceli (2007). 
28 Also see Smith ([1776] 1965, p. 754).  
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The economic power of religious organizations was similarly high in 
contemporary Islamic societies.  An enormous amount of wealth started to accumulate 
under a new mode of organization called the madrasa (including a mosque, library, and 
boarding house), a center for religious education developed by early schools of law in the 
tenth and eleventh centuries and supported by donations of land or rent-bearing property 
(Lapidus, 2002: 135).29  As a result of high degrees of church power and legitimation, in 
a parallel development in both Christian and Muslim monarchies of the Medieval Period, 
the rulers typically sought to control religious organizations by paying salaries and 
appointing leaders, establishing schools and seminaries, and granting tax exemptions and 
other subsidies for the provision of religious goods and services.  
Consistent with the model, there have been some recent cases of state control of 
the church associated with high degrees of church power but low (even negative) degrees 
of legitimation.  The experience of Turkey since the early twentieth century is a good 
example of this seemingly anomalous scenario.  Emerging from the ruins of the Ottoman 
Empire after the First World War, the new Republic of Turkey enacted various reforms 
aimed at reducing the influence of religion in public life and moving towards a more 
secular and westernized state.  The new ideology, of course, came into serious conflict 
with the centuries-old tradition of an Islamic state, and religious groups viewed the new 
state as corrupt and oppressive.  The ability of the state to derive legitimacy from 
religion, therefore, significantly declined and even occasionally became negative.  
                                                 
29 For the history and limitations of providing public goods under this system (called the 
waqf), see Kuran (2001).  Although we do not have reliable statistics on the proportion of 
property kept under the waqf system in the early Islamic states, the proportion had 
reached as high as three-querters of cultivated land by the early 20th century in Turkey 
(Kuran, 2001: 849). 
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Despite a neutral or even de-legitimizing relationship between state and religious 
organizations, however, the state has continued to be actively involved in the provision of 
religious goods because of the enormous power of organized religion.  Currently, over 97 
percent of the Turkish population is Muslim, religion continues to be a significant factor 
in public life, and some of the religious groups are well-organized in a hierarchical 
manner, commanding a vast amount of resources accumulated through donations and 
bequests.  As a result, in an attempt to control religion, the state has been heavily 
involved in the provision of religious goods by paying the salaries of clerics, maintaining 
religious buildings, financing the construction of new mosques, and funding and 
overseeing the design of religious curriculum in public schools.30  Turkey’s experience 
has been shared by several other predominantly Muslim countries, such as Tunisia and 
Egypt, which have chosen a more secular path after gaining independence in the 
twentieth century.  Because of the enormous power of organized religion in these 
countries, and despite a low or even a negative legitimation relationship between rulers 
and religious groups, the states have continued to control, rather than suppress, these 
groups by heavily funding religion.31   
A few caveats may be in order as we conclude the survey of possible 
configurations of the relationship between church doctrine, church power, and state 
provision of religious goods.  Some may disagree with our interpretation of the evidence, 
categorization of examples, or explanation of the relationship between church and state in 
specific cases.  Although the examples we have chosen illustrate the explanatory power 
                                                 
30 For the history and importance of religion in Turkey, see Mardin (2006) and Çarkoğlu 
and Rubin (2004). 
31 For a history of the varied political experiences of Islamic countries, see Demerath 
(2001: Chapter 3), Hourani, Khoury, and Wilson (2004).  
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of our argument, they are not meant to be exhaustive of all possibilities.  Numerous other 
examples can be found corresponding to other current and historical possibilities within 
each paradigmatic case.  Similarly, there may be other examples that would seem to be 
inconsistent with our argument, most likely because of circumstances that fall outside of 
the model.  While acknowledging these possibilities, we nevertheless maintain that the 
parameters identified by our model explain a great deal of the temporal evolution and 




 Church and state are perhaps the two most important social institutions created by 
humankind.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the history of their relationship has been stormy, 
ranging from cooperation to conflict.  In this paper, we have taken some tentative steps 
towards explaining that relationship from an economic perspective.  The argument was 
developed to answer a very simple question—namely, what role does the church play in 
supporting the ability of the sovereign to extract resources from the people through 
taxation?  The idea that the church, through its teachings (or doctrine) can facilitate this 
function of the state is an old one, dating at least to ancient civilizations when the 
sovereign declared himself divine, or at least divinely inspired.  Our model highlights two 
avenues by which an alliance with the church benefits the state.  The first is the Marxian 
notion that religious goods pacify the populous, thus allowing the state to extract more 
resources before citizens are incited to revolt.  The second is the fact that citizens pay 
taxes more willingly (i.e., tax evasion declines) when the state is seen as more legitimate.   
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 Importantly, we show that it is this second avenue that potentially makes state 
control of religion—i.e., establishment of a state-funded church, or repression of the 
church—desirable.  The reason is that an independent church serves the pacifying 
function without the need for distortionary tax financing.  Thus, if this were the church’s 
only function vis-à-vis the state, an independent church would be optimal.  However, an 
independent church will not provide the sovereign’s ideal level of legitimacy. As a result, 
it may pay the sovereign to seize control of the church, even at the cost of having to 
finance it out of taxes, in order to maximize his net gain.  A crucial factor in this decision 
is the nature of church doctrine—that is, how favorable or unfavorable is church teaching 
toward the state?  The more favorable is the church’s doctrine, the more likely it is that 
the state will benefit by taking control of the church.  In contrast, when church teaching is 
antithetical to the state, the sovereign may act to suppress the church, though we show 
that, owing to its pacifying function, the state will endure some opposition from the 
church before taking that extreme step. 
 Because of its importance to our theory, a useful extension to the model would be 
to endogenize the nature of church doctrine.  This, of course, would necessitate a deeper 
inquiry in to the objective function of the church, and a fuller characterization of the 
nature and purpose of religion. This poses a significant challenge, since religion and 
church are complex, and distinct institutions, the former being a collection of “teachings” 
aimed at explaining the mysteries of the universe and humankind’s place in it, and the 
latter being the organizational structure supposedly established to inculcate and spread 
those teachings.  Church doctrine therefore is generally comprised of a constellation of 
rules and ideas that reflect an amalgam of practical considerations and genuine 
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“revelations,” and any attempt to explain them as originating from a single decision 
maker or as the product of a single objective function may be asking too much.  We leave 










   
 
Figure 1. (b) λ > 0, Independent church dominates. 
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Figure 3. Regions where various regimes dominate as a function of church doctrine (λ) 
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TABLE 1 








Africa 48 0.69 
East Asia and Pacific 34 0.65 
Europe and Eurasia 53 0.94 
Near East and North Africa 20 1.00 
South Asia 8 1.00 
Western Hemisphere 33 0.79 
   
TOTAL 196 0.81 
 
Source: U.S. State Department, Report on International Religious Freedom for the years 





Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
State Funding (Index) 0.22 0.20 
Church Doctrine (Index) 0.16 0.14 
Are Religious Organizations Taxed? (Dummy) 0.54 0.64 
Are Donations Tax Deductible? (Dummy) 0.17 0.45 
Church Power (Herfindahl Index of Religion 
Shares) 
0.55 0.23 
Democracy (Index) 0.82 0.27 
Population (Log) 15.51 2.12 
Land Area (Million Square Kilometers) 0.71 1.94 
Income (Log of Per Capita  GDP) 8.60 1.20 
Life Expectancy at Birth 66.40 12.29 
Proportion of Population Using the Internet 0.13 0.17 
 
Sources: The variables labeled “State Funding,” “Church Doctrine,” “Are Religious 
Organizations Taxed,” “Are Donations Tax Deductible?”, and “Church Power” are based 
on the U.S. State Department’s Report International Religious Freedom for the years 
2001, 2003, and 2005, as coded by the Association of Religious Data Archives 
(thearda.com).  “Democracy” is the (reversed and rescaled) “2000 Political Typology” 
index based on the Freedom House's “Democracy's Century” report.  “Population,” 
“Land Area,” Income,” “Life Expectancy at Birth,” and “Proportion of Population Using 
the Internet” are from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook for the 
year 2005.  
 
Note: See the text for the contents of indexes and description of variables. 
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TABLE 3 

















Church Doctrine 0.42 <0.001 2.92 <0.001 0.46 <0.001
Are Religious Organizations Taxed? 0.01 0.80 0.07 0.61 -0.02 0.22
Are Donations Tax Deductible? 0.05 0.10 0.27 0.15 0.04 0.08
Church Power 0.22 0.001 1.22 0.003 0.25 0.03
Democracy  -0.11 0.02 -0.82 0.01 -0.06 0.07
Log of Population 0.02 0.001 0.17 <0.001 0.02 <0.001
Land Area -0.01 0.23 -0.07 0.12 -0.01 0.20
Log of GDP per Capita 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.03 0.07
Life Expectancy at Birth 0.00 0.90 -0.001 0.92 -0.001 0.71
Proportion Using the Internet 0.11 0.34 0.91 0.25 0.11 0.35
Constant -0.50 0.01   -0.57 0.001
       
N 184  184  184  
R2 0.43    0.42  
Log likelihood   -520.93    
 
Note: The dependent variable is “State Funding,” an index of state funding of religion.  
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